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Abstract— A number of fingerprint countermeasures have 
claimed that their countermeasures can prevent the user away 
from fingerprint tracking.  The research attempts to prove their 
claims and requires to study the effectiveness of their fingerprint 
prevention and observe the results of side effects after defence in 
order to assist the attentive user to know the limitation of current 
approaches. Under investigation, all countermeasures will be 
installed on the web browser and visit the developed hybrid 
fingerprint website in order to know the efficiency of the 
fingerprint resistance of all types.  The research shows that all 
fingerprint countermeasures nowadays are unable to obstruct all 
kinds of the fingerprint tracking and countermeasures that use 
the blocking technique appear more side effects to the web 
browser than other techniques.  Also, the increasing number of 
fingerprint attributes are increasing cause of unusual 
combination inside the Internet browser. 
Keywords; Browser Fingerprinting, Privacy, Web Tracking, 
Fingerprint Countermeasure,   Hybrid Fingerprint  
I. INTRODUCTION  
This paper investigates how the existing fingerprinting 
countermeasures work and what is the primary limitation of 
current countermeasures. The initial investigation is divided 
into five substantial parts. Firstly, the overall efficiency of 
current prevention techniques is studied and then evaluate how 
many types of fingerprinting are blocked from fingerprint 
tracking. This section has developed the hybrid fingerprint 
website which consists of JavaScript object, plugin, font and 
canvas fingerprint to observe the experience of fingerprint 
resistance. Secondly, it studies the side-effects of fingerprinting 
prevention by visiting sites and then find the overall 
satisfaction of the use of users.  The results of side-effects are 
shown in this section. Thirdly, it studies in-depth of 
fingerprinting attributes to find how the value of fingerprinting 
attributes is changed after rendering the web page. This part 
discusses that why the changed fingerprinting attributes have 
influenced to the display of the internet browser. Fourthly, this 
section trials the behaviour of the web browser if the 
fingerprinting attributes are modified while rendering a web 
page in order to find the cause of adverse effects of the internet 
browser. This part builds a Chrome extension to intercept web 
page before loading and then inject modified fingerprinting 
attributes into the Internet page and observing the result of 
side-effects.  Fifthly, the existing countermeasures will be 
studied that they have introduced the web browser stand out or 
not.  Finally, all results will be concluded which 
countermeasure probably used and propose a future solution.  
II. RELATED WORK 
Identifying the individual web browser being used is a real 
possibility [1] as the browser’s attributes that usually utilized in 
the web browser can be applied for identification of the 
Internet web browser. The various browser’s attributes that 
often use while surfing websites (e.g., navigator and screen 
object, etc.) will be concatenated into the string and then 
calculated with the hash functions.   The hash ID created will 
perform as a tracker to track the user across the Internet.  This 
created tracker is unnecessary to leave any files on the user 
computer which most users are unaware that they are being 
monitored with fingerprint technique as they cannot notice any 
files on their computers. Later, it can apparently claim that this 
approach could identify the web browser with an accuracy of 
96% by Eckersley [2], a man who built the Panopticlick 
project. He had invited general users to test the ability of 
fingerprinting by visiting his website. Also, he found that list of 
fonts provides the influential factor to assist the fingerprinting 
easily (obtained fonts through using plugins). He has calculated 
the entropy of fonts 13.9 bits of entropy, which mean that if he 
only uses one attribute to create the fingerprint tracker, it has 
only one in 15,286 similar browsers will be found on the web 
Internet. It can be seen that only one list of fonts is distinctive 
enough to create a unique tracker. Also, he had demonstrated 
that a simple heuristic program could predict the changing of 
browser’s attributes with a 94% accuracy.  From these results, 
it can be clearly seen that fingerprinting technique can track 
users in practice without the doubt.  The significant impact of 
the Panopticlick project has inspired several subsequent papers. 
Later on, Boda [4] demonstrated that a list of fonts could be 
gained using JavaScript without using of the browser’s plugins. 
They combined a list of fonts, the IP address, time zone, and 
screen resolution which can identify the user’s web browser 
with a high level of success. This means that fingerprinting is 
not only relying on the browser’s plugin but can also use 
JavaScript like the alternative plan to obtain the list of fonts. 
Later, the canvas element in HTML5 is one attribute to be used 
fingerprinting [5], called the “canvas fingerprinting”. This 
attribute will write and read an image while rendering the web 
page. As the value of a retrieved image provides a unique 
characteristic of the user operating system that is sufficient 
enough to be used for identification of a web browser.  In the 
same year,   the browsing history on the Internet browser is 
implemented like a new tracker to track the web browser [6], 
which can show detection accuracy of 69%. However, this 
technique is not practical for the latest version of the modern 
web browser.   Other methods are not mentioned as there are 
several ways to fingerprint the web browser such as packet 
ordering information [7],  combining IP address and UserAgent 
[8] and mobile fingerprinting [9]   audio fingerprinting [10]   
which almost all come from the inspiration of Panopticlick 
project. 
III. COUNTERMEASURES 
Several approaches have proposed the possible solutions to 
inhibit the fingerprint tracking.  The “Do not Track” (DNT) 
header is proven [13] that user cannot trust this technique as 
most websites can fingerprint a web browser by regardless of 
the DNT value.  Tor [14] is widely acknowledged as it helps 
some users who require to remain anonymous online.  Tor has 
modified various attributes in the Firefox web browser in order 
to protect users away from the fingerprint tracking. Tor not 
only is used against fingerprint technology but also is designed 
for different objectives such as protecting source online, 
keeping secret information of the company and so on.   The 
research had collected the different defensive fingerprint 
countermeasures as Table 1 below. 
TABLE 1  EXISTING COUNTERMEASURES 
Countermeasure Platform 
Tor [13] Running on Tor browser 
Rubberglove [15] Running on Chrome 
Chameleon [16] Running on Chrome 
CanvasFingerprintBlock 
[18] 
Running on Chrome 
ChromeDust [21] Running on Chrome 
StopFingerprinting [20] Running on Chrome 
UserAgent  Switcher for 
Chrome [21] 
Running on Chrome 
Canvas Fingerprinting 
Blocker [22] 
Running on  Firefox 
FireGloves [23] Running on FireFox 
FP-Block [17] Running on FireFox 
Stop fingerprinting [24] Running on FireFox 
 
While few papers (e.g., FPGuard [11] and Privaricator [12]) 
claims that their countermeasures can keep user away from 
fingerprint tracking, these unproven allegations are more  
difficult to evaluate whether their model can prevent better or 
not as the status of software has not been made available. 
Therefore, this research had mainly focused only on existing 
approaches which can now download  through the web 
Internet. 
IV. TESTING 
In this section, the current fingerprint countermeasures had 
been investigated whether they could stop collecting user data 
from the fingerprint companies. In order to estimate the 
potential impact of using existing countermeasures, the hybrid 
fingerprinting site [3] had been developed specifically for 
investigating the efficiency of fingerprinting prevention. This 
site had also studied the value of fingerprinting attributes of 
the web browser while rendering a web page as a real 
fingerprint website by using font, plugin, canvas and 
JavaScript object fingerprint.  Also, the proper fingerprint 
prevention is not sufficient enough for the user who needs the 
potential countermeasure to protect their privacy. Therefore, 
all spectrum of user experience had been raised to consider the 
user satisfaction while they are browsing a web page.    This 
section will be organised into five substantial portions, testing 
prevention, testing side-effects of prevention, studying 
fingerprinting attributes, studying the behaviour of 
fingerprinting attributes and studying effects of information 
paradox. 
A. Testing prevention  
     As for this part, it will verify the existing fingerprint 
countermeasures in Table 1, mostly available for free on the 
web Internet.  All fingerprint countermeasures had been 
installed in the web browser, except Tor browser, and then 
visit the hybrid fingerprint website in order to learn from 
experience of visiting website, results as Table 2 below.  
TABLE 2  TYPE OF PREVENTION  







Tor √ * √ - 
RubberGlove √ - √ - 
Chameleon ≈ - - ≈ 
CanvasFingerprintBlock - - - ≈ 
ChromeDust - - - - 
StopFingerprinting - - - - 
Canvas Fingerprinting 
blocker 
- - - √ 
FireGloves √ √ √ - 
FP-Block √ - √ - 
Stop Fingerprinting - √ √ - 
UserAgent  Switcher to 
Chrome 
- - - - 
(√) The countermeasure can prevent fingerprint by  
            blocking,  spoofing or randomization 
(*)   The countermeasure prevents by   entropy limitation 
(-)    The countermeasure allows fingerprinting 
 ≈    The countermeasure can detect fingerprint but cannot   
       prevent fingerprint tracking.  
 
Considering from the table 2 above, Tor and Fireglove can 
prevent three types of fingerprinting when compared with other 
countermeasures. RubberGlove,  Stop fingerprinting and FP-
block can prevent two types of fingerprinting. As 
CanvasFingerprintBlock and canvas fingerprinting can only 
prevent one fingerprinting (because they are designed to 
address only one type of fingerprinting).  The remaining 
countermeasures (Chameleon, ChromeDust and 
StopFingerprinting)  do not appear to protect fingerprint 
tracking as they claim. Thus, it can observe that most 
countermeasures on the web Internet are unable to prevent all 
types of fingerprinting, and in particular, some 
countermeasures cannot inhibit user tracking as they claim. 
B. Side effects of prevention 
This section studies adverse impacts of existing 
countermeasure to the popular web browser by selecting only 
existing countermeasure that can prevent user tracking from 
the result of Table 2. The study will use each current 
countermeasure to visit five websites in order to observe the 
effects of fingerprint prevention, namely: facebook.com, 
youtube.com, google.com, and bbc.com. Note that some 
popular sites in the top 100 list do not use English languages 
which make it difficult to determine whether the site is 
checking it works correctly. For this reason, the research only 
selects the English-language website. 









Tor √ √ √ √ 
RubberGlove √ √ √ - 
CanvasFingerprintBlock - - - - 
Canvas Fingerprinting - - - - 
FireGloves √ √ √ - 
FP-Block - √ - - 
Stop Fingerprinting - √ - - 
Problems of display:  Content, fonts  or screen size are 
changed.  
Problem of functionality:   The video and music do not play, 
or some functionalities are unavailable. 
Difficult to use: Rendering a webpage is a slow process, 
makes user annoying, and is unsmooth. 
Login Problem:  The user faces the login problems. 
 
Considering the results from Table 3, Tor seemed to have 
several problems, particularly the login problem and 
challenges of the Internet speed.  As RubberGlove and 
Fireglove had the same challenges as well as Tor, except for 
login problems due to as unchanged location of a user. 
CanvasFingerprintBlock and Canvas Fingerprinting appeared 
to have insignificant adverse effects. FP-block and Stop 
Fingerprinting seemed the slightest problem. However, the 
fingerprinter might know that only list of fonts and plugins 
were modified. They might use remaining attributes to 
fingerprint (e.g., userAgent and canvas). Thus, FP-Block and 
Stop Fingerprinting appeared few adverse effects which test 
result might attract the attentive users who are looking for a 
suitable approach to block fingerprint technique. 
C. Study fingerprinting attributes 
The result of the previous section is the great benefit to 
investigate further whether which fingerprinting attributes 
modified probably effects to the Internet browser. The further 
investigation had been done in this chapter for analysis in-
depth in order to find which attribute introduce the problems 
of the user browsing experience. The research had selected the 
fingerprint attributes which were mainly used from many 
fingerprintes to show how many attributes are handled in each 
fingerprint countermeasure.  Each countermeasure was 
arranged to visit hybrid fingerprint website once in order to 
check all fingerprinting attributes which the result is shown in 
Table 4. The result of Table 4 was analysed along with the 
table 3 so as to find the answer why the web browser that was 
installed why they cannot perform correctly. Also, this section 
will not consider the canvas fingerprint countermeasure as this 
attribute does not introduce any side-effects to the Internet 
browser. 
As for the result from table 4, each countermeasure 
handled fingerprinting attributes differently. They only use 
three basic techniques to prevent fingerprint tracking, 
blocking, randomising, and spoofing technique.  In addition, 
they do not handle all fingerprinting attributes as they were 
unaware of which browser attributes were used by 
fingerprinters. Thus, which of most mainly focus on the high 
entropy characteristics (userAgent, the list of fonts, plugins) 
which are sufficient enough to deceive the tracking of 
fingerprinting technique.  Considering Tor, Rubberglove and 
FP-Block, they appear to deal with more fingerprinting 
attributes than other methods; they use spoofing and blocking 
technic. Even though they controlled fingerprinting attributes 
alike, but the adverse effects of Tor browser was opposite with 
FP-Block. It might be that Tor modifies more browser’s 
attributes than the general fingerprinting attributes shown in 
Table 4. FP-block only altered fingerprinting attributes in 
Table 4 that it was not showing that they had produced the 
profound impact to the web browser. RubberGlove dealt with 
18 fingerprinting attributes which mainly use blocking 
technique. As for table 3 and table 4, it can be seen that 
blocking technology is the profound impact to the modern 
web browser. As FireGloves handled eight fingerprinting 
attributes and mainly used blocking technique, the result of 
adverse effect is similar to the RubberGlove, rather the 
significant impact to the web browser.  Stop Fingerprinting 
deal with two fingerprinting attributes which it shows the 
insignificant effect on the internet browser. Dealing with few 
attributes might be a good idea, but remaining of fingerprint 
attributes might be fingerprinted. 
To sum up, the existing countermeasures that use 
randomization and spoofing technique seem to produce 
minimum effects to the internet browser.  The increasing 
number of fingerprinting attributes is not confirmed that it 
associated with  the adverse effects to the web browser while 
blocking technique is the profound impact to the web browser. 
 







































D. Studying fingerprinting attributes 
This section had studied that if the fingerprinting attributes 
were modified, what are side-effects to the displaying of the 
web browser.  This section will build the Chrome extension by 
injecting modified fingerprinting attributes before rendering a 
web page.   The research has initially spoofed the low entropy 
of fingerprinting and then observe the problems of modified 
the low entropy attributes by visiting the regular website. 
Then, the research has changed the high entropy attributes and 
did the same process like the previous experiment. 
o Navigator (16 properties): 
appCodeName, appVersion, doNotTrack, product,  productSub,  
cookieEnabled, vendor, vendorSub, online, platform, online,  
language, languages,  JavaEnabled; 
o Navigator.mimeTypes (4 properties) 
enablePlugin,  description,  suffix, type; 
o Screen (11 properties ): 
horizontalDPI, verticalDPI, availLeft, availTop, availHeight, 
availWidth, colorDepth,  pixelDepth,  width, height,  bufferDepth; 
 
The high entropy consists of as follows: 
o List of plugins deriving from Navigator.plugins (4 properties): 
Name, filename, description, length; 
o List of fonts  
o UserAgent  
 
The web browser will be used to visit 30 favorite websites 
of alexa.com  in order to study that if the fingerprinting 
attributes are changed before loading the web page, what is 
the consequence of modification should be considered. 
 
TABLE 5   THE RESULT OF MODIFYING FINGERPRINTING ATTRIBUTES  
Attributes Result 
Low entropy Not any effect to the web browser 
High entropy The effects to functionality of the 
web browser 
Low and high entropy The effects to functionality of the 
web browser 
 
Giving Table 5, it can be seen that changing little entropy 
attributes is not any effects to render of a web page as the high 
entropy of fingerprinting attributes has the influence of 
rendering the web browser.  
E. The effects of information paradox 
Both Eckersley [2] and Nikiforakis [13] found that some 
existing fingerprint countermeasures had intended to prevent 
fingerprint tracking, but it turned out to be made the risk of 
being tracked or monitored by fingerprinters due to the 
unusual combination of browser-related information.  Thus, it 
should consider this problem along with fingerprinting 
prevention.  This section had tested the results of existing 













































List of plugins Blocking Blocking Block
ing 
Blocking Blocking 













appCodeName Spoofing - - Blocking Spoofing 
Product Spoofing - - Blocking Spoofing 
Product-Sub Spoofing - - Blocking - 
Vender Spoofing - - Blocking Spoofing 
Vendersub Spoofing - - Blocking - 
Online - - - Blocking Spoofing 
appVersion Spoofing - - Blocking Spoofing 
cookiesEnabled() - - - Blocking Spoofing 
javaEnable() - - - Blocking spoofing 
Navigator.mimeType () blocking - Block
ing 
Blocking Blocking 
Screen color and pixel  
depth 
spoofing - - - Spoofing 
Screen width and height Spoofing - - - Spoofing 
Screen availLeft,  
availTop, availHeight 
and availWidth 
Spoofing - - - - 
Screen hosizontalDPI, 
verticalDPI 
Spoofing - - - - 
Canvas fingerprinting - - - - - 
Do not track - - - Blocking Spoofing 
Timezone Spoofing - - - Spoofing 
OS & Kernel Version Spoofing - - Blocking Spoofing 
JS: Flash Enabled Blocking - Block
ing 
Blocking Blocking 
CPU Spoofing - - Blocking Spoofing 
Language Spoofing - Spoof
ing 
Blocking Spoofing 
Languages Spoofing - Spoof
ing 
Blocking Spoofing 
TABLE 6  INFORMATION PARADOX  
Countermeasure Paradox 
Tor                                                 - 
UserAgent 
Spoofing 
 Inconsistency between operating system and 
navigator.plugins 
Fireglove Inconsistency between CPU and userAgent 







RubberGlove Inconsistency between navigator object and HTTP 
header request 
 
From the result in Table 6, the number of attributes had 
increased the risk of abnormal combination implicitly. 
Therefore, handling few attributes had the lower risk of 
unusual combination than dealing with more attributes. 
Among experiment the research had learned that some 
attributes cannot control them.  For instance, cookiedEnable 
and Do not Track (DNT)  shown in HTTP header had  shown 
the contradictory result on values of JavaScript object. 
However, dealing with few fingerprint attributes had increased 
the chance of being fingerprinted as the remaining attribute 
was not handled. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to discover the effectiveness of 
currently available fingerprint approaches.  The result will be 
more useful for attentive users who are looking for some 
methods to protect their privacy. In term of efficiency of 
prevention, most countermeasures cannot prevent all types of 
fingerprinting which cause the web browser to be unable to 
avoid from being tracked.  Regarding the user’s experience, 
the existing countermeasure that uses blocking technique 
appears to generate more user dissatisfaction than other 
techniques. For studying fingerprint attributes,  almost 
countermeasures use blocking and spoofing technique to 
prevent fingerprint tracking, and all countermeasures only 
handle the high entropy attributes to stop fingerprinting. In 
addition, the issue of anticipation that which fingerprint 
attribute might be selected  by fingerprinters still be a 
challenge for fingerprint countermeasure in the future. Also, 
modifying fingerprint attribute with code injection shows that 
the high entropy attributes more side effects than the low 
entropy attribute. In term of the information paradox, some  
countermeasures cannot conceal the modified fingerprinting 
attributes, and the remaining attributes might be used to 
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